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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state appeals from the district court's order granting post-conviction 
relief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Sean M. Cook filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 
conviction for rape. (R., pp. 7-15.) He asserted claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. (R., pp. 14-15.) The district court 
summarily dismissed some of his claims, and the matter proceeded to an 
evidentiary hearing on whether Cook's criminal trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to prevent admission of evidence that Cook had threatened a witness and 
failing to object to evidence of the victim's out-of-court statements. (R., pp. 265-
284; see generally Tr.) The district court ultimately concluded that trial counsel 
had been ineffective for both alleged failures and granted a new trial in the 




1, n concluding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
evidence that Cook threatened a witness, the district court failed to even address 
counsel's stated reason for not objecting. Does application of the law to the facts 
of this case show that the district court erred in concluding that counsel provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel when he made the strategic decision to not 
object to the evidence of threats? 
2. The district court concluded that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to evidence of the victim's initial disclosure. The record shows that counsel 
used that evidence to argue that the victim's delay in disclosing indicated she 
had fabricated her claim she was raped. Does application of the law to the facts 
of this case show that the district court erred in concluding that counsel provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel when he made the strategic decision to not 




The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Analysis And Reached An 
Erroneous Conclusion Regarding Counsel's Tactical Decision To Not Object To 
Evidence Of The Witness's Explanation For His Prior Inconsistent Testimony 
A. Introduction 
Paul Nelson, Cook's jailhouse cell partner, testified at the preliminary 
hearing. (P.H Tr., p. 90, Ls. 10-25.1) At that hearing he initially denied ever 
having told the police or "anybody in the jail about [his] conversations with Mr. 
Cook." (P.H. Tr., p. 92, Ls. 7-19.) Nelson then testified that Cook had admitted 
having sex with the victim but had stated that it was consensual. (P.H. Tr., p. 92, 
L. 16 - p. 93, L. 9; p. 96, Ls. 3-14.) He later admitted stating to a police officer 
that Cook had told him that he had forced the victim to have sex. (P.H. Tr., p. 93, 
L. 13 - p. 94, L. 17.) 
Prior to the start of presentation of evidence at trial, the district court in the 
criminal case took up questions about the admissibility of certain evidence. (Trial 
Tr., p. 107, Ls. 9-17.2) One of those questions addressed "alleged evidence that 
the Defendant had threatened to harm witness Paul Nelson's family." (Trial Tr., 
p. 108, Ls. 4-7.) Cook's counsel did not object to the admission of Nelson's 
1 The district court took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript from 
the underlying criminal trial as part of evidence it received. (R., p. 380.) All 
citations to the "P.H. Tr." are to the transcript of the preliminary hearing in docket 
no. 36145. 
2 The district court received the transcript of the criminal trial as an exhibit. (Tr., 
p. 4, L. 24 - p. 5, L. 13.) The state's citation to the ''Trial Tr." is to the trial 
transcript in docket no. 36145. 
3 
testimony regarding the alleged threats because it was "part and parcel of Mr. 
Nelson's testimony or contention," which he concluded was "not true." (Trial Tr., 
p. 108, Ls. 8-16.) 
At the trial, Nelson testified that Cook had initially told him the sex with the 
victim was consensual, but that he later twice stated that he had stalked her to 
her hotel prior to the rape, had pushed a door in, and had pinned her to the bed 
with an elbow and raped her. (Trial Tr., p. 371, L. 21 - p. 378, L. 25.) Nelson 
testified that just prior to Cook's preliminary hearing, Cook confronted him about 
being a witness and "started making threats and stuff ... that something would 
happen to [Nelson's] daughter" and wife. (Trial Tr., p. 381, L. 4 - p. 383, L. 1.) 
Because of the threat Nelson was "worried about [his] family" and therefore at the 
preliminary hearing only testified about Cook's first statement, that the sex had 
been consensual. (Trial Tr., p. 383, Ls. 2-25.) 
In his post-conviction petition Cook alleged that counsel was ineffective for 
not objecting to Nelson's testimony that Cook threatened his family just prior to 
him testifying at Cook's preliminary hearing. (R., p. 14.) The district court stated 
"the question in this case is whether the potential of the jury's emotional 
response to the evidence that Cook threatened to rape and murder Nelson's 
family would have caused the jury to decide Cook's case without regard to the 
evidence's probative value." (R., p. 396.3) The trial court concluded that "a 
3 The evidence does not support the district court's conclusion that Nelson 
testified that Cook threatened to rape his wife and daughter. Nelson testified 
Cook said "something would happen" to Nelson's daughter, that his girlfriend 
would "follow" Nelson's wife, and the wife "would be done just the same" as the 
victim. (Trial Tr., p. 381, L. 20 - p. 382, L. 15.) Although the threat that the wife 
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motion to suppress [sic] Nelson's testimony that Cook threatened to rape his wife 
and daughter likely would have been granted" and that there was "simply no 
strategic reason to allow highly prejudicial evidence to be admitted if it could be 
excluded." (R., p. 396.) The court also concluded there was prejudice because 
"the jury could not have ignored the inflammatory nature of the threat in 
determining Cook's guilt." (R., p. 400.) 
The district court's analysis is flawed because, although it at one point 
articulates the legal standards for ineffective assistance of counsel, it does not 
actually apply them to the facts of this case, instead concluding that finding the 
evidence inadmissible is enough to find deficient performance. The district court 
failed to even address counsel's stated reason for not objecting (that the threat 
was "part and parcel" of Nelson's contention). Application of the correct legal 
standards to the facts of this case shows that counsel was not ineffective 
because the decision to not object was reasonable under the circumstances. 
B. Standard of Review 
When reviewing the district court's decision on a post-conviction case after 
a hearing, the appellate court "will not disturb the lower court's factual findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous" but will "exercise free review of the district 
"would be done just the same" as the victim might, in some circumstances, be 
interpreted as a rape threat, it is unlikely that Cook was threatening that his 
girlfriend would rape the victim. It is more likely that the threat that Nelson's wife 
would be "done just the same" as the victim was a threat to kill the wife, because 
Nelson had also threatened to kill the victim. (See Trial Tr., p. 366, Ls. 4-19). 
Thus, there was a threat to "murder" the wife and daughter, but no threat to 
"rape." 
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court's application of the relevant law to the facts." Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 
233,244,233 P.3d 164, 175 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 
50,56,106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004)). 
C. The District Court Found No Objective Deficiency By Counsel, A 
Necessary Prerequisite To Its Determination That Counsel's Performance 
Was Deficient, And Therefore Erred In Granting Relief 
Application of the law to the facts of this case shows the district court 
erred. It is well established that the "lack of objection to testimony fall[s] within 
the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions." Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 
877 P .2d 365, 368 (1994). "A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance 
must apply a 'strong presumption' that counsel's representation was within the 
'wide range' of reasonable professional assistance." Harrington v. Richter, 131 
S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 
(1984)). "When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court 
does not second-guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions 
cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to 
have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 
199 P.3d 123,136 (2008). 
In State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, _,313 P.3d 1,40 (2013), the post-
conviction petitioner alleged counsel was ineffective in failing to object to reports 
by doctors admitted at capital sentencing because admission of those reports 
allegedly violated the petitioner's Fifth Amendment and confrontation rights. The 
Idaho Supreme Court did not address the merits of such an objection at all; 
6 
rather, it held that "[i]n the absence of evidence suggesting that the introduction 
[of the allegedly excludable evidence] was the product of inadequate preparation 
or ignorance of the relevant law, we hold that the district court did not err by 
summarily dismissing this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." kL 
In Payne, 146 Idaho at 563, 199 P.3d at 138, the Court addressed a claim 
that trial counsel performed deficiently by not presenting an expert on the 
"fallibility of eyewitness identifications." The Court stated, "'the decision of what 
evidence should be introduced at trial is considered strategic or tactical.'" kL 
(quoting Bagshaw v. State, 142 Idaho 34, 38, 121 P.3d 965, 969 (Ct. App. 
2005)). Because Payne "provided no evidence which suggests that this 
decision" regarding what evidence to present "resulted from inadequate 
preparation, ignorance or other shortcomings" the "presumption that counsel's 
performance fell within the acceptable range of professional assistance" required 
the conclusion that there had been no deficient performance. Payne, 146 Idaho 
at 563,199 P.3d at 138. 
As in Dunlap and Payne, Cook presented no evidence suggesting trial 
counsel's election to not object to the evidence of threats because it was "part 
and parcel" of the witness's testimony was the product of inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the relevant law, or any other objective shortcoming. Thus, Cook 
failed to present even a prima facie claim of deficient performance. 
The district court stated the "question" before it was whether the evidence 
to which counsel elected not to object was prejudicial to Cook. (R., p. 396.) 
Answering that question in the affirmative, the district court concluded the 
7 
regarding the threats was inadmissible. (ld.) Having concluded the 
evidence was inadmissible, district court determined "there is simply no 
strategic reason" to not object. (Id.) However, the district court did not address, 
much less find, ignorance of the law, inadequate preparation, or any other 
objective shortcoming. The district court therefore applied an incorrect analysis 
and made no factual finding necessary to overcome the "presumption that 
counsel's performance fell within the acceptable range of profession assistance." 
Payne, 146 Idaho at 563, 199 P.3d at 138. 
Moreover, the district court failed to even address defense counsel's 
stated grounds for his non-objection. The district court stated the evidence was 
"arguably relevant" as evidence of consciousness of guilt. (R., p. 395.4) There is 
no evidence, however, that defense counsel declined to object on this basis. 
Rather, defense counsel declined to object because the evidence of the threats 
was "part and parcel of Mr. Nelson's testimony or contention." (Trial Tr., p. 108, 
Ls. 13-16.) In context, it is clear that the evidence of the threats was admitted at 
trial to explain why Nelson's preliminary hearing testimony was markedly different 
from his trial testimony. (Trial Tr., p. 381, L. 4 - p. 385, L. 1.) The record thus 
4 By finding the evidence only "arguably relevant" the district court also erred as a 
matter of law. '''[A] defendant's threats against a witness are admissible to show 
consciousness of guilt.'" State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 463, 235 P.3d 409, 
413 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting United States v. Begay, 567 F.3d 540, 552 (9th Cir. 
2009)). Such evidence is also relevant to assessing the trial testimony of the 
threatened witness. Ebron v. United States, 838 A.2d 1140, 1152-53 (D.C., 
2003). The evidence was relevant as a matter of law; not merely "arguably 
relevant" as the district court stated. The district court also cited no applicable 
law justifying its determination that a defendant can insulate himself from 
admission of this type of evidence by making a more violent threat, as opposed 
to a less violent one. 
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shows the evidence of threats was inextricably intertwined ("part and parcel") 
Nelson's prior inconsistent testimony at the preliminary hearing. Defense 
counsel's election to not object to admission of evidence of both the prior 
inconsistent testimony and the witness's explanation for the inconsistency, on the 
basis that it tended to show that Nelson was not a reliable witness (Tr., p. 62, L. 8 
- p. 63, L. 14), was a strategic decision, and there was neither evidence nor any 
finding of any objective shortcoming associated with that strategic decision.5 
Trial counsel declined to object to testimony by Nelson that Cook had 
threatened him just prior to the preliminary hearing. Counsel stated the reason 
he declined to object was that he believed that this testimony was "part and 
parcel" of Nelson's testimony, which included an admission of having testified 
inconsistently at the preliminary hearing. Cook provided no evidence of any 
objective shortcoming by counsel in electing to not object, and the district did not 
find any. Application of the law to the facts of this case shows that Cook did not 
prove any objective shortcoming of counsel, a prerequisite to any determination 
of deficient performance. By granting relief in the absence of any objective 
shortcoming by defense counsel, the district court erred. 
5 As will be addressed more thoroughly in the next subsection addressing 
prejudice, defense counsel's conclusion that admission of evidence of Nelson's 
prior inconsistent testimony would likely lead to the admission of testimony of 
Cooks' threats was an eminently reasonable one, and application of the correct 
legal standards shows the evidence was admissible. 
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The District Court Applied An Incorrect Prejudice And Evidentiary 
Standard And Therefore Erred In Its Prejudice Analysis 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must prove a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 
1999). '''A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.'" McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570,225 P.3d 700, 
703 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)). As noted above, the district 
court failed to address defense counsel's stated grounds for not objecting to the 
evidence that Cook threatened Nelson. When those grounds are addressed, the 
record shows that Cook was not prejudiced because the evidence was 
admissible. Moreover, even if objectionable, failure to object did not establish a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome of the trial. 
Pursuant to !.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the 
district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice-which is the tendency to 
suggest a decision on an improper basis-substantially outweighs the probative 
value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 
(2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct. App. 1994); 
State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651,656,862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The 
rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant 
evidence. 
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State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) 
(emphasis in original). 
Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely 
prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party's case. See State v. 
Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285,290,775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) ("Certainly that evidence 
was prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial is 
demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in 
prejudice to a defendant."). Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that 
is unfairly prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an 
improper basis. Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908. 
In this case the district court found the evidence of threats relevant only to 
show consciousness of guilt. (R., p. 395.) Relevance, however, is a question of 
law reviewed de novo by this Court. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 
1185, 1187 (2009). "It is settled that upon introduction of evidence which 
seemingly impeaches or contradicts a witness's testimony, the witness must be 
permitted a reasonable opportunity to explain the impeaching evidence." 
Openshaw v. Adams, 92 Idaho 488, 492, 445 P.2d 663, 667 (1968). Thus, 
Nelson's explanation that the inconsistent testimony he offered at the preliminary 
hearing was influenced by the threats was relevant as a matter of law once 
evidence of Nelson's prior inconsistent testimony was introduced at trial. 
Because the evidence of threats was relevant as a matter of law to explain 
the prior inconsistent testimony, the proper weighing test should have been 
whether the probative value of the evidence as an explanation for the prior 
11 
inconsistent testimony was substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair 
prejudice. The district court, failing to recognize this relevance, never conducted 
the proper balancing test. Moreover, the question is not how the post-conviction 
judge would have exercised this discretionary decision, but whether the trial 
judge could have admitted the evidence without undermining confidence in the 
outcome of the trial. Because it would not have been reversible error for the trial 
judge to admit the evidence, Cook failed to prove any prejudice. 
In the alternative, even if the evidence should have been objected to and 
excluded under the Rules of Evidence, its admission did not undermine 
confidence in the outcome of the trial. First, because the evidence of threats is 
extremely probative of the reason for the prior inconsistent testimony,6 it would 
have been unfairly prejudicial to admit evidence of the prior inconsistent 
testimony without evidence of the witness's explanation. Exclusion of the prior 
inconsistent testimony along with the evidence of the threats would have resulted 
in the loss of potential impeachment. 
Second, the district court concluded that "the jury could not have ignored 
the inflammatory nature of the threat in determining Cook's guilt." (R., p. 400.) 
The prejudice standard is not whether the jury would have "ignored" the 
"inflammatory nature" of the evidence, but whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood they would have reached a different result, such that confidence in the 
verdict is undermined. If the jury found Nelson's testimony regarding the threats 
credible there is no reason (and no evidence suggesting) they would not have 
12 
his testimony that Cook confessed incredible. Nor is there any reason they 
would evaluated the other evidence of Cook's guilt differently. In short, 
applying the correct standard and looking at all the evidence presented at 
(instead of merely looking at the evidence the court found excludable), there is 
no basis for concluding Cook proved by a preponderance of evidence a 
substantial likelihood of a different result. 
The district court applied an incorrect legal standard when it failed to 
recognize that the evidence of the threats was relevant as a matter of law to 
explain why Nelson provided prior inconsistent testimony at the preliminary 
hearing. It thereafter applied an incorrect weighing test, which failed to consider 
the relevance of the evidence for the purpose it was offered and admitted. It 
further erred by analyzing the evidentiary question de novo instead of 
determining whether the trial court would in fact have exercised its discretion in 
the same fashion. Finally, it utterly failed to consider the evidence actually 
presented at trial. The district court must be reversed because application of the 
correct legal standards shows that Cook failed to show prejudice arising from trial 
counsel's election to not object to testimony about Cook's threats against Nelson. 
6 As noted above, FN 4, supra, the evidence was also extremely probative of 
consciousness of guilt, although it was not expressly admitted for that purpose. 
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II. 
The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Analysis And Reached An 
Erroneous Conclusion Regarding Counsel's Tactical Decision In Relation To 
Evidence Of The Victim's Disclosure Of The Rape 
A. Introduction 
At trial the victim testified that immediately after the rape she called her 
friend, Hoss Dillon. (Trial Tr., p. 225, L. 4 - p. 229, L. 22.) Although she spent 
some time with Dillon and his brother Hank thereafter, she did not immediately 
disclose the rape, and in fact claimed nothing was wrong, despite Dillon's 
repeated inquiries into whether she was all right. (Trial Tr., p. 229, L. 23 - p. 
245, L. 25.) She eventually, however, started crying and disclosed the rape, and 
Dillon called the police. (Trial Tr., p. 246, L. 1 - p. 248, L. 20.) On cross 
examination the victim admitted being "reluctant" to tell Dillon about the rape. 
(Trial Tr., p. 275, L. 15 - p. 276, L. 19.) 
Hoss Dillon testified about being called by the victim, and that she 
sounded "upset." (Trial Tr., p. 289, L. 18 - p. 290, L. 24.) He went to where she 
was staying, and while together he repeatedly asked her what was wrong 
because she seemed upset. (Trial Tr., p. 290, L. 25 - p. 306, L. 22; p. 309, L. 9 
- p. 311, L. 10.) She didn't say anything was wrong at first, but when asked the 
second or third time she disclosed that she had been raped. (Id.) On cross-
examination trial counsel pOinted out that Dillon had testified at the preliminary 
hearing that he had asked the victim what happened "six times," and only after 
being asked the sixth time did she say she had been sexually assaulted. (Trial 
Tr., p. 327, L. 5 - p. 328, L. 12.) 
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In closing argument trial counsel argued that the timing of the disclosure of 
rape by victim to Dillon was inconsistent with her claim to have been raped 
and indicated she had fabricated the allegation. (Trial Tr., p. 522, Ls. 3-16; p. 
524, Ls. 3-19; p. 537, L. 5 - p. 538, L. 15.) 
Cook asserted in post-conviction that trial counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to Hoss Dillon's testimony regarding the disclosure of the rape, 
asserting it was "inadmissible hearsay." (R., p. 11, ,-m 22-25.) The district court 
found deficient performance solely upon the conclusion that the testimony in 
question was "inadmissible hearsay and if an objection had been made to the 
testimony it likely would have been granted." (R., pp. 397-99.) The court found 
prejudice on the basis that the hearsay "provided the State an opportunity to 
repeat the victim's testimony." (R., p. 401.) Again, the district court has applied 
an incorrect legal standard to both prongs of the anaJysis. Application of the 
correct legal standard to the facts of the case shows neither deficient 
performance nor prejudice. 
B. Standard of Review 
When reviewing the district court's decision on a post-conviction case after 
a hearing, the appellate court "will not disturb the lower court's factual findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous" but will "exercise free review of the district 
court's application of the relevant law to the facts." Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 
233, 244, 233 P.3d 164, 175 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 
50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004)). 
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C. The District Court Applied An Erroneous Legal Standard To Its Analysis Of 
Whether Trial Counsel's Performance Was Deficient 
As stated above in more detail, decision of whether to object to the 
admission of evidence is strategic, and therefore can be considered deficient 
performance only if made on the basis of ignorance of the law, inadequate 
preparation, or another shortcoming capable of objective review. State v. 
Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, _,313 P.3d 1,40 (2013); Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 
921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994). Again, the district court determined 
counsel's performance was deficient without finding the necessary factual 
predicate of ignorance, inadequate preparation, or other objective shortcoming. 
The district court effectively held that every potentially meritorious objection must 
be made, a standard incompatible with the applicable law. 
Application of the correct legal standard requires Cook to overcome the 
presumption of competency by a preponderance of evidence showing counsel's 
tactical decision was based on ignorance of the law, inadequate preparation, or 
some other objective shortcoming. There is no evidence whatsoever of any 
objective shortcoming. Counsel very obviously in this record made the tactical 
decision to use evidence of the disclosure to argue that its timing called the 
victim's testimony into doubt. Applying the correct legal standards to this 
question shows that there was no deficient performance. 
D. The District Court Applied An Erroneous Prejudice Standard 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must prove a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
16 
have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct App. 
1999). Application of this legal standard shows no prejudice. 
The testimony Cook asserted his counsel should have objected to was as 
follows: 
O. What did she tell you when she got back up to the room? 
A. She said that [Cook] had raped her, basically. 
O. Can you tell us in more detail what you recall her saying? 
A. Um-she looked pretty upset. She said that-um-that he 
forced sex on her. 
O. Did she tell you-
A. She said that he grabbed her neck. 
O. Did she tell you anything else as far as physical contact? 
A. Um-not that I recall, no. 
(Trial Tr., p. 306, Ls. 1-12.) Thus, the entirety of the evidence at issue is Dillon's 
testimony that the victim said, after being repeatedly asked what was wrong and 
denying that something was wrong, that Cook "raped her," he "forced sex on her" 
and that he "grabbed her neck." This evidence did not meet Cook's burden of 
proving by a preponderance of evidence a reasonable probability of a different 
result had an objection been made. 
The district court found prejudice because the evidence in question 
"provided the State an opportunity to repeat the victim's testimony." (R., p. 401.) 
What prejudice arises from such repetition is not obvious. Evidence of prior 
consistent statements is often admissible, presumably without any unfair 
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prejudice. I.R.E. 801 (d)(1). Even where evidence of prior consistent 
is erroneously admitted only prejudice is to potentially bolster the 
credibility of the witness. State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477,488,873 P.2d 122, 134 
(1994) (finding erroneous admission of evidence of a prior consistent statement 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). On the other hand, evidence of prior 
statements by witnesses is often admitted by opposing parties on the basis that it 
will impeach the witness. See,~, I.R.E. 613. In this case trial counsel 
specifically used the evidence of the disclosure of the rape to Hoss Dillon to 
attack the credibility of the victim by arguing that the timing of the disclosure 
indicated that it was a fabrication. That this necessarily meant that certain limited 
parts of the victim's account of the rape were repeated did not prejudice Cook. 
The other basis of the court's prejudice analysis was that it allowed the 
jury "to consider testimony from persons who had no first-hand knowledge of the 
factual issues in dispute at Cook's triaL" (R., p. 401.7) The state is unaware of 
any legal authority supporting this analysis. The state readily admits that only 
two people had "first-hand knowledge" of the events constituting the rape-the 
victim and Cook. That Cook was unfairly prejudiced by all evidence other than 
the victim's testimony is a ludicrous proposition. There is no reason to believe 
that the jury was misled into believing Dillon had "first-hand knowledge" of 
7 The district court also cited, but did not elaborate on, lack of cross-examination 
as a source of prejudice when hearsay is admitted. (R., p. 401 (citing Isaacson 
v. Obendorf, 99 Idaho 304, 309, 581 P.2d 350,356 (1978).) Cook obviously had 
the opportunity to cross-examine the source of the statements, which was the 
victim, who also testified about her disclosure to Dillon. Thus, no conceivable 
prejudice arose from lack of cross-examination. 
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whether the rape occurred. His testimony regarding what he heard the victim say 
when) was limited to "first-hand knowledge. lack of "first-hand 
knowledge" of the rape itself was not in any cognizable way prejudicial to Cook, 
much less a basis for concluding that admission of his testimony that the victim 
disclosed the rape to him undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial. 
The evidence in question-that after repeated inquiries the victim 
disclosed to Hoss Dillon that Cook "raped her," "forced sex on her," and "grabbed 
her neck"-was clearly admissible for the non-hearsay purposes of establishing 
when and what the victim disclosed about the events underlying the charge. 
Cook's trial counsel used the evidence for the non-hearsay purpose of 
impeaching the victim. That the jury could theoretically have considered the 
evidence as substantive evidence of guilt was not prejudicial where the victim 
actually testified about the events and was cross-examined regarding those 
events. Admission of the very limited testimony in question, specifically used by 
counsel as a means of attacking the victim's credibility, falls far short of 
undermining confidence in the verdict. Application of the law to the facts of this 
case shows the district court erred by finding prejudice. 
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CONCLUSION 
state requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order judgment granting post-conviction relief. 
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